Posted by Hans Müller on February 27, 2022 at 14:38 p.m

I wrote this article on September 19th, 2011 in the course of my work as a working group leader for the history of the EUROPA-UNION Heilbronn.

(EC, customs union, accession of former EFTA states, Schengen Agreement, Single European Act)

With the treaty on the "European Coal and Steel Community" (ECSC), a process had started in Western Europe that is still driving European integration forward - sometimes dynamic and future-oriented, but sometimes also unsatisfactorily slow. This European integration process always progressed when far-sighted politicians who thought beyond the borders of their own country were able to agree on a European common denominator in the respective situation. European integration is built on a large number of compromises; no politician, no country was able to impose its own ideas flawlessly and usually did not strive for this.

Right from the start of the integration process, the politicians in the member states, including German politicians, saw the need to anchor the idea of ​​Europe in the minds of the general public. Tony Judt reports that on February 4.2.1952, 1 Konrad Adenauer explained to his cabinet colleagues during the discussion of the Schuman Plan that people had to be given a new ideology and that this could only be a European one. (60) The idea of ​​Europe an ideology? Adenauer would probably no longer use this term today and would rather speak of a European vision. "A common vision for the European Union was never as necessary as it is today - and seldom so far away," laments Jean Monnet Professor Vivien A. Schmidt 2 years later (XNUMX).

Tony Judt goes on to report that this reorientation after the end of the war made sense for the intellectual and political elites, "but the little people weren't concerned with the new Europe, they wanted to survive and get ahead." To lay the foundations for a development that was later described as the "economic miracle". "Working, saving, getting ahead, buying, consuming - that was the life purpose of most West Germans, which was also emphatically propagated by politicians," writes Judt.

Europe was not in the focus of the general public, was always "far away" and supposedly a very abstract event. For whatever reason, it was not possible to anchor the connection between the progress of people and the European integration process in the general public. Europe was and is little perceived, in the course of time even predominantly negative. “Europe” as a slogan doesn't do it,” complained Herbert Wehner as early as 1972. "We must try to make the vital problems that can only be solved within the framework of the community as rationally as possible the focus of parliamentary activities and make people familiar with the paths leading to the solution." (3)

The European integration process has its ups and downs. A particularly low point was reached when the founding of the European Defense Community (EDG) failed on August 30.8.1954, 1950 in the French National Assembly. Ironically, France, which had proposed the creation of a European army in 6, refused; the other XNUMX states had already agreed. Today one would speak of a crisis. But it was precisely during the crisis that Europe developed with particular energy.

At the beginning of June 1955, the ECSC foreign ministers met at a conference in Messina, Sicily, at the initiative of the Benelux countries; later it is said that the conference was inspired by the "spirit of Messina". The 6 states agreed on a resolution with the aim of founding the European internal market and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). A committee headed by the Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak presented a report in 1956, which became the basis for the "Roman Treaties" solemnly signed on March 25, 1957 in Rome. It was about the four core elements of European integration: establishment of a customs union with common external customs; establishment of a common market; free movement of goods, people, services and capital and close cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
In addition, the six signatories decided to set up a joint parliamentary assembly, the forerunner of today's European Parliament; the establishment of a common court of justice and a common economic and social committee. The merger of the Commission and the Councils of Ministers took place in 1965.

With the "Treats of Rome" a mighty step towards Europe was taken. This gave concrete targets for the European integration process - the focus was on the economy - which had to be implemented. And there was always a European ups and downs. Jacques Delors, who achieved great merit as President of the EC Commission (1985 - 1994), described the time after the entry into force of the "Roman Treaties" as extremely productive, "because the six member states had agreed on regulations that reduced customs duties before the deadlines set in the treaty.” (4)

However, if one looks at the contract in the light of the Greek and euro crisis of 2010/11, its weak points become apparent. “Nevertheless… the EEC appeared with one voice in foreign trade negotiations. This gave the member states as a whole a much stronger negotiating position than would have been possible for each individual,” writes Gerhard Brunn (5). However, the Commission's idea that after the abolition of the internal customs borders the states should be economically linked with one another could not be achieved. "All member states continue to operate a national economic policy according to their common ideas of order." (6).
A lack that was to be coped with as long as it was only about trade and economic relations. However, with the introduction of the common currency at the latest, the Commission's earlier ideas for a coordinated economic policy should have been taken up again.

In addition, it was clear to many Europeans that the "Treats of Rome" could not be the end of the European integration process. Europe also had to be shaped beyond the realm of the economic: as a social Europe and as a democratic Europe; the position of the European Parliament came into focus. Hans Apel (1932 – 2011) wrote very farsightedly in 1972: “If the EEC is not accompanied by an even more far-reaching political agreement in the long run, then it will stop halfway.” (7)

But what should this political agreement look like? The question arose early on, who should be accepted into the community of six and who shouldn't? Great Britain's application for membership failed twice due to Charles de Gaulle's veto.

The contrasting terms of a "Europe of fatherlands" and a "European federal state" describe the often diametrically opposed ideas in the community. The French President de Gaulle increasingly became the brake on integration efforts; one could describe him as a difficult European. De Gaulle saw his main task in consolidating and expanding France's position in the world. "Insofar as the coming together of the Western European states did not harm this goal or even help it, de Gaulle was also a European. But his vision of Europe had little in common with that of Monnet and other 'founding fathers'. He rejected a United States of Europe with far-reaching powers for Parliament and the Commission. For him, only a “Europe of fatherlands” came into question, a confederation of states in which the members should work together as closely as possible, but remain sovereign.” (8)

These discussions are also reflected at the local level in Heilbronn. On August 11, 1965, a round table discussion took place in the Heilbronn Ratskeller with Dr. Karl Mommer (SPD), Adolf Mauk (FDP) and Heilbronn City Councilor Reinhold Fyrnys (CDU). The Heilbronner Voice reported on this with the headline "Charles de Gaulle is not Europe" (9). In mid-May 1969, the state conference of the Europa-Union took place in Heilbronn. In his presentation, Dr. Karl Mommer (SPD), the year 1969 could perhaps be celebrated as the year of the birth of a new phase in the history of the European movement. With the resignation of de Gaulle, a man left the political scene who represented a brake on European unification through his orthodox and rigid attitude. (10)

In the ups and downs of the European integration process – Jean Monnet had already declared that the United States of Europe could not be created in one go, as idealists dreamed. They would have to emerge step by step (11) – the strange and changing interdependence of Germany cannot be overlooked. History does not repeat itself, the historians explain. But in the course of history, the same and similar problems are repeated, the same and similar questions arise. In post-war Europe something like this: What will become of Germany? How can we prevent national arrogance and contempt for other cultures from plunging the continent back into misery?

Klaus Harpprecht, one of the doyens of journalism in Germany, recalls the immediate post-war period: "Young people should also make it clear... That the integration of the German colossus, weak as it may have been at the time, was the basic motive of the European union (this and the common protection against the superior power of the Soviet Union). The productive integration turned out to be fortunate for Europe and above all for the Germans” (12).

When the new Ostpolitik was developed in Germany many years later, that policy of small steps under the heading "Change through rapprochement", the West was again asking about the future position of our country. Europe was going through a dramatic phase at the time. "If things were going well in Europe, we would not have met here today," said German Chancellor Willy Brandt at the conference of the heads of state and government of the EEC on December 1st and 2.12.1969nd, 13 in The Hague. "If our community could already speak with one voice, then our main topic would be foreign policy: the question of a European peace order, the negotiations with the countries of Eastern Europe, our interests in view of the conflict in the Middle East." At the time, Brandt spoke of the Federal Republic's search after agreement with the East, in cooperation and coordination with the Western partners and emphasized almost imploringly: "The connection that we have entered into with one another should be indissoluble and should become ever closer." (XNUMX) Here it was again, the coupling between progress in the "German Question" and the progress of European integration.

This coupling was to become effective again twenty years later. In the phase of great upheaval in Europe, when 1989/9= Germany was on the way to reunification, it was again a question of clearing up a number of deep-seated concerns of the western partners. The specter of a “Fourth Reich” haunted the media in various countries (14). Then it surfaced again, that fear of what would become the largest and economically strongest country in the community, with a future population of 82 million, and which was now actually to become the “Colossus”.

Margaret Thatcher describes in her memoirs the joint considerations with France's Francoise Mitterand "how we could put the German Moloch in its place" (15). Mitterrand hoped for the support of the Soviet Union: “I don't have to do anything to stop it; the Soviets will do it for me. They will never have this greater Germany on their doorstep.” (16) However, when these expectations failed, the French changed tactics: “The Germans can have their unity, but not gratis and franco”. There must be absolutely no doubt that the enlarged Germany is not going its own way, and certainly not in the direction of its old Central European areas of interest. Kohl must commit to continuing to pursue the Europe project under Franco-German aegis, and Germany must be integrated into an “ever closer” union – the conditions of which, in particular those of a common European currency, must be laid down in a new treaty (17). In addition to the fear of the "German Moloch", the tried and tested European policy approach was back: Germany's integration into the European community. Not just for control, but above all for the benefit of everyone - not least for the benefit of reunified Germany, into whose new federal states large amounts of investment grants flowed from Brussels. So the later common European currency, the euro, was to a certain extent the by-product of German reunification.
In a newspaper article on the Day of German Unity in 2011, Wolfgang Schäuble, who led the unification negotiations with the GDR in 1990, recalled the concerns of the western partners and the importance of European integration for our country. "Without our embedding in the European Union, the peaceful reunification of Germany would have become infinitely more difficult - if not impossible." (18)

The path to the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed on February 7.2.1992, 1.11.1993 and came into force on November 1989, 90, was thus already mapped out during the reunification process. And you can draw an interesting parallel: in 1969/70 Helmut Kohl faced a similar task to Willy Brandt in XNUMX/XNUMX when it came to the new Ostpolitik. Both chancellors had to credibly assure their European partners that there would be no "German wrong turns". Along with Francoise Mitterand and Jacques Delors, Kohl became the driving force in the European integration process.

Maastricht – adopted after the great upheavals in Europe – did not come into being overnight and out of nothing. The Maastricht Treaty was based on considerations and decisions from previous years. The far-sighted preparatory work of Jacques Delors deserves special mention. He was Commission President from 1985 to 1994. Under his leadership, European integration made great strides. His presidency ended 25 years of Euroscepticism ("Eurosclerosis") and stagnation. (19) The 1985 White Paper initiated by Delors begins with the sentence: "Is it presumptuous to announce and then implement the decision to abolish all intra-Community borders by 1992?" (20) The "Single European Act", also known as Treaty of Luxembourg” came into force on July 1.7.1987, 282. Jacques Delors has described it as his favorite contract. Accelerated harmonization and the completion of the internal market were introduced in 21 directives. The responsibilities of the EEC were extended to the areas of research and development, environment, transport, social policy, labor law policy and equal rights and introduced the "European Political Cooperation" with the aim of a common foreign policy. (1989) The Delors Report of June 1.7.1990 - created and published before the "change" in Eastern Europe - contained a three-stage plan for the development of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the first stage of which the European Council on 1988. came into force in 23. Delors saw monetary union as a decisive step towards political union, and he was not alone in this. In XNUMX, Hans-Dietrich Gentscher specified his idea in a memorandum; Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt published a joint strategy paper and the CDU and SPD also supported it. The Maastricht Treaty, as the next important step towards integration, was in the air, so to speak. For the German constitutional judge Peter Michael Huber, that contract was a “quantum leap” (XNUMX); thus the European Monetary Union with a European Central Bank was decided.

In retrospect, the question is whether the citizens of the time realized what was happening in Europe? Were they sufficiently informed by politicians and the media? Was Europe explained convincingly enough? Or was it possible that people failed to take the citizens with them to Europe, thereby laying the foundation for that diffuse European weariness that makes an unemotional public discussion so difficult today?

The Maastricht Treaty was signed on February 7.2.1992th, 1.11.1993 and came into force on November XNUMXst, XNUMX. What makes this contract so special and so important that the Federal Constitutional
court already had to deal with it in 1993? It was and is important: The time for Europe was ripe! The Europa-Lexikon briefly describes the world situation at the time: "The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany helped the heads of state and government of the EC to agree on strengthening the international role of the community" (24) Maastricht summed it up the previous three European Communities - EEC, EGKS, EURATOM - together in the European Union. Brunn (25) describes the main innovations:

- the introduction of a common currency by 1.1.1999 at the latest;
- a common foreign and security policy (CFSP);
- cooperation in justice and home affairs;
- the transfer of new competences to the community;
- strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the European institutions.

In a special section of his book, Brunn describes, under the heading "The ratification crisis" (26), a phenomenon that was to delay the European integration process more and more: "The Maastricht Treaty was negotiated without any particular concern from the population of the member states and was influenced by European public opinion in the On the whole it was well received. The European politicians therefore assumed the tacit approval of the majority in the member states...". So-called Eurosceptics, in fact often opponents of European integration, had now discovered European decisions as a way of generating national mood waves and/or using Europe as a lever for domestic politics. A development that ultimately caused the draft of a European constitution to fail in referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005.

Similar problems already existed in the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty. In Denmark, a positive vote was only achieved in a second referendum. Ahead of the upcoming referendum in France, the opponents' campaign "against the alleged looming loss of French self-determination and "undemocratic, technocratic Brussels" was having a considerable impact. With 51 percent of the votes, the contract achieved the narrowest possible majority. In Great Britain - despite the special regulations that the conservative Prime Minister John Major had negotiated in Brussels - there was strong resistance in Major's own party, not least from his predecessor Margaret Thatcher. The treaty only passed the British House of Commons in July 1993. In Germany, the Maastricht Treaty ended up before the Federal Constitutional Court. This decided in October 1993 that the contract is compatible with the Basic Law.

On November 1.11.1993, 1992, almost a year after the decision by the heads of state and government, the Maastricht Treaty came into force. In April 27, Helmut Kohl was still able to hold out the prospect of the creation of the United States of Europe. After the ratification crisis, that dream was for an unforeseeable future. dreamed of. (XNUMX)

reference

(1) Judt, Tony: "History of Europe from 1945 to the Present"; Book Guild
Gutenberg, 2005; S-309
(2) Schmidt, Vivien A.: "The EU - an extinct vision" in "New Society/
Frankfurter Hefte” No. 7/8 – 2001; p. 28
(3) Wehner, Herbert: Special issue "Europe 1972" of the magazine "Die Neue Gesellschaft",
Issue 4 – April 1972; p. 249
(4) Delors, Jacques: "Memoirs of a European" ; Parthas Verlag GmbH, Berlin
2004; p. 219
(5) Brunn, Gerhard: "European Unification from 1945 to the Present"; Reclam
Stuttgart, 2002; p. 164
(6) Brunn, Gerhard, loc.cit.; p. 163
(7) Apel, Hans: Special issue "Europe 1972" of the magazine "Die Neue Gesellschaft",
Issue 4 – April 1972; p. 280
(8) May, Manfred: "European History"; Gutenberg Book Guild, 2007; p. 186
(9) Daily newspaper Heilbronner Voice, August 12.8.1965, XNUMX
(10) Daily newspaper Heilbronner Voice, August 16.6.1969, XNUMX
(11) May, Manfred, loc.cit. p. 183/84
(12) Harpprecht, Klaus (b. 1927); "Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte, No. 7/8-2011;
Special issue “Oh Europe”, p. 8
(13) Wilkens, Andreas (ed.): “We are on the right track – Willy Brandt and the
European unification”; Publisher JHW Dietz Nachf. GmbH,
Bonn (2010); p. 451/52
(14) May, Manfred, loc.cit. p. 194
(15) Judt, Tony, loc.cit. p. 734
(16) Judt, Tony, loc.cit. p. 734
(17) Judt, Tony, op.cit. S-735
(18) Schäuble, Wolfgang: “Welt am Sonntag” No. 40, October 2.10.2011nd, 4, p. XNUMX
(19) Wikipedia: "Jacques Delors"; Status: 11.9.2011
(20) Wikipedia; loc.cit. Status: September 11.9.2011, XNUMX
(21) Hüttmann/Wehling: “The Europalexikon”, publisher JHW Dietz Nachf.
Bonn (2009), p. 80
(22) Brunn, Gerhard, loc.cit. p. 261
(23) Huber, Peter Michael, federal constitutional judge; Interview with the “Süddeutsche
Newspaper” on September 19.9.2011, XNUMX
(24) Hüttmann/Wehling, loc.cit. p. 333
(25) Brunn, Gerhard, loc.cit. p. 271
(26) Brunn, Gerhard, loc.cit. p. 272
(27) Brunn, Gerhard, loc.cit. p. 275