To be able to discuss in the forums, you must be logged in. Either use the IndieWeb (Web sign-in) or you can ask me for this blog (e-mail) to register. In both cases you then go through the registration process.

ForumsEurope | European Federalists | EUROPA-UNION Heilbronn: Perspectives on EuropeA European Defense Uni...

Please to create posts and topics.

A European Defense Union

#1 March 5, 2023, 12:26 p.m

Posted by peter schulze on March 5, 2023 at 12:26 p.m
Introduction:

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, has given new impetus to the establishment of an EU defense union.

Bisher The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) introduced with the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 is an integral part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The CSDP is the main political framework through which member states develop a European strategic security and defense culture and tackle conflicts and crises together. Due to the tense geopolitical context, CSDP has been one of the fastest evolving policy areas over the past decade.

In the GASP and the GSVP, according to Art. 23 - 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Lisbon Treaty of 2009), the European Council (heads of government of the EU member states) and the Council of the European Union in the formation of Defense Ministers all major decisions.

The decisions on CSDP are taken by the European Council unanimously caught, only in a few important ones exceptions, which will concern the European Defense Agency (EDA). with a qualified majority.

The the European Commission and European Parliament have only Hearing and information rights. (EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy.

GSDP measures are not subject to the judicature of the European Court of Justice.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (also known colloquially as EU Foreign Minister, since December 2019 Joseph Borell), who also acts as Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), plays the central institutional role. He chairs the Foreign Affairs Council of Defense Ministers, which is the EU's decision-making body for CSDP. Its task is to present proposals in CSDP areas to the Member States. He runs the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defense Agency (EDA).

There is a Political and Security Committee (PSK), which is made up of the ambassadors of the member states and develops new strategies for important developments in world affairs.

Article 42(3) TEU introduced a European policy in the area of capabilities and armaments and stipulated that the EDA "if necessary carry out its tasks in Liaison with the Commission’ (Article 45(2) TEU), particularly with regard to EU policy in the areas of research, industry and space travel.

Article 21 TEU indicates that the multilateralism is at the heart of the EU's external action. The EU is committed to various frameworks for enhanced coordination and cooperation, in particular with the United Nations and the NATO, but also with other regional organizations such as the African Union.

There are also a few other institutions:

The EU Military Committee (EUMC) consists of the chiefs of staff, represented by their military representatives, who usually represent their country in personal union with the EU and NATO. The Military Committee is the highest military body and advises the PSK on military issues. He maintains relationships with other international organizations and countries outside the EU and NATO. He is also responsible for the military direction of operations and provides military guidance to the military staff. The Chairman attends meetings of the PSC, the NATO Military Committee and the Council – in the latter case when a military issue is on the agenda.

The EU military staff (EUMS) is part of the European External Action Service. Its tasks include early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning and, in the event of a crisis, determining, recording and deploying the multinational armed forces, mostly in coordination with NATO. The EUMS determines the "how", the "if" lies at the political level.

The Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management develops the civil plan goals of the EU and is responsible for their implementation. It makes recommendations and statements to the PSK and other council bodies. In addition, since 2001 there has been a police unit in the General Secretariat of the Council for the planning and implementation of EU police missions.

The civil/military cell the EU will in the EUMS furnished. Usually it will Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) of NATO or a national headquarters. For this, one EU planning cell in SHAPE set up and NATO invited to enter into liaison arrangements with the EUMS. In addition, a planning cell is to be set up in the EUMS, which can be used if necessary. It will support the EU member states in crisis identification and in civilian operations that combine and plan for the civilian and military components. In addition, it will support the national headquarters.

The task of European Defense Agency (EDA) is supporting the member states and coordinating their cooperation in the areas of military research, armaments planning and procurement. This is intended to achieve synergy effects in the form of cost savings, among other things.

The European Union Satellite Center (EUSC) in Torrejón (near Madrid, Spain) observes the earth and creates satellite images and maps, particularly in the service of CSDP. The EUSC therefore plays an important role, especially in conflict prevention and monitoring

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Paris produces studies that form the basis for negotiations and decisions in the ESDP.

The East StratCom Task Force (Strategic Communications Team East) of the EU's European External Action Office (EEAS) for Strategic Communications has been active since September 1, 2015 to counter Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns and to draft an action plan on strategic communications. (EuvsDisinformation campaign.) Hybrid warfare combines military with economic means and propaganda in media and social media to fuel tension and sow confusion. Using disinformation as an instrument of hybrid warfare is intended to influence public opinion and undermine the credibility of state institutions. Hybrid actors use the entire spectrum from the targeted control of discussions in social networks to the manipulation or falsification of information on news portals. The "East StratCom Task Force" works together with the NATO Strategic Communication Center of Excellence, exchanges information with it and fights "hybrid" threats together.

Further development:

Since 2016 laid the High Representativein Federica Mogherini - from February 2019th, XNUMX Joseph Borell -- the European Council of Heads of Government a "Global strategy for the foreign and security policy of the European Union" which are reviewed annually in coordination with the Council, the EU Commission and the European Parliament.

The strategy sets 5 priorities;

- the security of the European Union,
- the resilience of states and societies in the eastern and southern neighborhoods of the EU,
- an integrated approach to conflict management,
- regional orders based on cooperation,
- global governance for the 21st century.

In November 2016, HR also presented the Council with an "Implementation Plan for Security and Defense" which included a Coordinated Annual Review on Defense CARD) and new uniform Permanent Structured Cooperation PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), which now includes 46 projects.

At the same time, HR submitted one European action plan in the defense area (European Defense Action Plan, EDAP) before, with suggestions for a European Defense Fund (EDF) with a focus on defense research and capacity building included, which were also implemented.

In 2021 a Strategic compass developed to define and assess the EU's security and defense strategies for the next five to ten years.

Against the background of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, extensive changes were made to the strategic compass to take into account the destabilization of the European security order.

At the meeting of the European Council from 24.-25. The current strategic compass was approved on March 2022 during the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The main objectives are recommendations and solutions in the areas of: crisis management, resilience, capacities and partnerships.

And finally ...

The "defense union" was only a concept, first proposed in 2003 by Joschka Fischer and his French colleague at the time Dominique de Villepin was proposed, but has so far been covered by the "Common Security and Defense Policy", which in turn is regulated differently from the usual community structures (Commission, Parliament, Council).

So far there has been no communitarisation, but the associated actions are very common.

Crisis management missions and operations and the joint permanent cooperation of the armed forces are the most visible and tangible expression of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

However, as a result of the Russian war against Ukraine, a second level within the EU is becoming visible, that of the European Commission.

Actually, the Commission does not have a political mandate in the narrower sense, but the task of monitoring the implementation of and compliance with the EU treaties on the one hand and drafting bills on this basis on the other hand and then submitting them to Parliament and the Council as the two political decision-making bodies submitted for discussion and resolution.

In the development of common positions in the Council, however, since shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU Commission has proven to be the most professional and technically best positioned of the three EU institutions and the most capable of acting in this crisis. It has quickly and purposefully developed the 10 packages of sanctions against Russia so far and has become the driving force behind Ukraine's accession to the EU, although the Council should actually be the leading institution in this matter.

Shortly after the EU decided to break the "taboo" on financing the purchase and supply of arms to Ukraine, the Commission undertook the task of helping member states coordinate and finance their arms supplies.

It was also the first consultation between the European Commission and the government of an active war zone.

These developments seem to be ignoring Parliament.

It is not yet foreseeable how and when these developments of ever-increasing integration and cooperation will lead to a genuine defense union, perhaps with its own central service/ministry and a European armed force/army.

Incidentally, experience and joint efforts to find solutions show how strong and effective the European treaty structures of the EU treaties from 2009 still are, because they repeatedly enable surprising flexible solutions.

The first outlines of a future European Defense Union can be seen from the variety of successful measures and solutions.

However, it is certainly related to the further development of the European Union into an "ever stronger union through deepening and widening" which, according to the ideas of the European federalists of JEF, EUD, UEF and others, should result in a federal European state.

Backgrounds:

PESCO – concrete projects with German participation

So far, 46 active Permanent Structured Cooperation projects have been approved in three project rounds. Overall, they serve to close the capability gaps identified by the European Defense Agency in the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and thus strengthen the EU's ability to act.

The spectrum ranges from the development of underwater drones for combating sea mines to the establishment of a disaster control center and the development of a protection system for ports and sea routes. Other projects include the establishment of a rapid reaction force to defend against cyber attacks or the further development of the Tiger combat helicopter. The core of the projects is that the EU and its member states can act successfully (together) in operations and missions. The basic requirements for this are skills, interoperability, the same standards, training and above all: trust.

For each PESCO project, a participating member state has taken on the coordination.

Germany is currently coordinating six Permanent Structured Cooperation projects:

The construction of one European Medical Commands EMC (European Medical Command) and a project for Improving the crisis response capability of the EU member states EUFOR CROCE, (European Union Force Crisis Response Operation Core). In addition, Germany, together with the project partners, will Set up a Europe-wide network of logistics hubs in order to be able to move troops and material quickly. In addition, Germany has the coordination for the improvement of the geographic, meteorological and oceanographic information support GeoMETOCGeo-Meteorological and Oceanographic (Geo-Meteorological and Oceanographic) of missions and operations as well as for the development of cooperation for the operation and use of the euro drone accepted. In addition, Germany controls the establishment of a center CIDCCC (Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre) for coordinating the exchange of information in the areas of cyber and IT information technology.

The project to coordinate the training of soldiers for EU training missions, the EU TMCC (European Union Training Mission Competence Centre) has now been completed.

What is the relationship between PESCO and NATO?

The military cooperation of the EU members complements that in the North Atlantic defense pact NATO. The two organizations are not in competition with each other. Rather, NATO also benefits from a more effective EU, whose allied members form a militarily strong European pillar in the transatlantic alliance and assume more international responsibility.

Unanimity principle - decisions with qualified majority (BQM) transitional clauses (passerelles)

As a rule, decisions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are taken unanimously.

One way to weaken this principle is to "constructive abstention" (Article 31(1) subparagraph 2 TEU), where a Member State abstains from the unanimous vote and may justify this abstention with a formal declaration. In this case, that Member State is not obliged to implement the decision, but must accept that the decision is binding on the Union and refrain from anything that might contradict or hinder Union action. Likewise, the other Member States should respect the decision of the abstaining Member State.

However, in a number of cases, which are enshrined in Article 31(2) TEU, the qualified majority:

- when the Council adopts a decision establishing an action or a position of the Union, on the basis of a decision of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union pursuant to Article 22;

- if the Council, acting on a proposal submitted to it by the High Representative(s) at the request of the
European Council, acting on its own initiative or on the initiative of the High Representative, adopts a decision establishing an action or a position of the Union;

- when the Council adopts a decision implementing a decision establishing an action or a position of the Union;

- when the Council appoints a special representative under Article 33.

In the TEU, however, two safety precautions are provided to mitigate the qualified majority. The first safety precaution is theemergency brake clause" (Article 31(2) TEU), which allows a formal vote to be avoided when a Member State declares its intention to oppose a qualified majority decision for substantial national policy reasons, which it must also state.

The HR then works with the Member State concerned to find an acceptable solution. If such a solution is not reached, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may arrange for the issue to be referred to the European Council for a unanimous decision.

A second safety precaution is provided for in Article 31(4) TEU, according to which decisions with military implications are exempt from BQM.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

On September 12, 2018, the Commission issued a Communication discussing ways to Passover clause in the field of CFSP apply. The basic idea was to strengthen the role of the EU on the international stage. In his 2018 State of the Union address, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker already called on the EU to "stand on its own two feet" and to strengthen the international role of the euro. The Franco-German Meseberg declaration also called on the EU to speed up and make its decision-making more efficient.

Although successive reforms have introduced qualified majority voting for the majority of policy areas, unanimity remains the rule in the CFSP area.

As explained by the Commission, the main disadvantage of unanimity in the CFSP is that it prevents coherent positions from being reached quickly, on the basis of which the EU can act decisively on the international stage. Therefore, the introduction of qualified majority voting in some areas of the CFSP would have positive effects, as it would allow the EU to act more efficiently from firm and coherent positions and respond to pressing foreign policy challenges. This would also increase the resilience of the EU by protecting member states from being pressured by third countries. The Commission does not claim that all problems in the field of CFSP can be solved with QM alone. However, given the need to balance member states' interests and enforce the EU's position in bilateral relations, QM could lead to some improvements, especially considering that the Council itself can act in policy areas where QM is the norm (e.g. trade), rarely conducts a formal vote and takes decisions by consensus.

Against this background, the Commission has asked Member States to consider cases where QoM could have a positive impact and offer added value.

The Council has asked the Commission not to agree on common positions on CFSP or related matters when the instruments provided for by the Treaty could be used for this purpose.

In addition, the Commission has asked the Council not to apply the CFSP legal framework to external aspects of policies governed by the TFEU, thus abusing the unanimity principle.
The Commission has also recommended the use of the passerelle clause in the following three areas:

- Human rights in multilateral fora
Given that human rights are universal and indivisible and that the Union needs to stand united while striving for political unity and credibility as a soft power, the Commission has recommended that EU positions to be communicated in international fora, which are currently being decided by consensus, instead determined by qualified majority. For example, the Commission has proposed that the European Council adopt a decision, based on Article 31(3) TEU, whereby the Council decides on EU positions on human rights issues in international fora by qualified majority.

- Issuance and amendment of sanction regulations.
Sanctions are a very powerful tool that the EU can use to reinforce its foreign and security policy agenda. Against this background, these restrictive measures have been used frequently in recent years to prevent, stop and influence foreign policy developments and to exert economic and political pressure. In the case of changes to the lists of EU restrictive measures decided by the United Nations or – if the changes were not politically explosive – by the EU itself, the Council has already decided by a qualified majority. However, the Commission has recommended that QM under Article 31(3) TEU be applied at all times and that the European Council unanimously adopt a decision whereby the Council decides on the setting of sanctioning regimes by qualified majority.

- Civil Common Security and Defense Policy
Common Security and Defense Policy civilian missions are an important tool that the EU can use to respond to and engage in post-crisis crises to support national authorities and local communities. In order to be able to overcome the challenges, however, they must be used quickly. In a difficult political environment that is constantly changing, effective and agile management becomes the decisive factor.

On the basis of Article 31(3) TEU, the Commission has proposed that the European Council adopt decisions providing for all decisions relating to the civilian Common Security and Defense Policy to be adopted by qualified majority.

The Commission has proposed starting missions for rule of law capacity building and security sector reforms, as these are linked to other instruments that are also decided by qualified majority.

Introduction:

The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, has given new impetus to the establishment of an EU defense union.

Bisher The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) introduced with the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 is an integral part of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The CSDP is the main political framework through which member states develop a European strategic security and defense culture and tackle conflicts and crises together. Due to the tense geopolitical context, CSDP has been one of the fastest evolving policy areas over the past decade.

In the GASP and the GSVP, according to Art. 23 - 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU, Lisbon Treaty of 2009), the European Council (heads of government of the EU member states) and the Council of the European Union in the formation of Defense Ministers all major decisions.

The decisions on CSDP are taken by the European Council unanimously caught, only in a few important ones exceptions, which will concern the European Defense Agency (EDA). with a qualified majority.

The the European Commission and European Parliament have only Hearing and information rights. (EP Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense Policy.

GSDP measures are not subject to the judicature of the European Court of Justice.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (also known colloquially as EU Foreign Minister, since December 2019 Joseph Borell), who also acts as Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), plays the central institutional role. He chairs the Foreign Affairs Council of Defense Ministers, which is the EU's decision-making body for CSDP. Its task is to present proposals in CSDP areas to the Member States. He runs the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defense Agency (EDA).

There is a Political and Security Committee (PSK), which is made up of the ambassadors of the member states and develops new strategies for important developments in world affairs.

Article 42(3) TEU introduced a European policy in the area of capabilities and armaments and stipulated that the EDA "if necessary carry out its tasks in Liaison with the Commission’ (Article 45(2) TEU), particularly with regard to EU policy in the areas of research, industry and space travel.

Article 21 TEU indicates that the multilateralism is at the heart of the EU's external action. The EU is committed to various frameworks for enhanced coordination and cooperation, in particular with the United Nations and the NATO, but also with other regional organizations such as the African Union.

There are also a few other institutions:

The EU Military Committee (EUMC) consists of the chiefs of staff, represented by their military representatives, who usually represent their country in personal union with the EU and NATO. The Military Committee is the highest military body and advises the PSK on military issues. He maintains relationships with other international organizations and countries outside the EU and NATO. He is also responsible for the military direction of operations and provides military guidance to the military staff. The Chairman attends meetings of the PSC, the NATO Military Committee and the Council – in the latter case when a military issue is on the agenda.

The EU military staff (EUMS) is part of the European External Action Service. Its tasks include early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning and, in the event of a crisis, determining, recording and deploying the multinational armed forces, mostly in coordination with NATO. The EUMS determines the "how", the "if" lies at the political level.

The Committee on the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management develops the civil plan goals of the EU and is responsible for their implementation. It makes recommendations and statements to the PSK and other council bodies. In addition, since 2001 there has been a police unit in the General Secretariat of the Council for the planning and implementation of EU police missions.

The civil/military cell the EU will in the EUMS furnished. Usually it will Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) of NATO or a national headquarters. For this, one EU planning cell in SHAPE set up and NATO invited to enter into liaison arrangements with the EUMS. In addition, a planning cell is to be set up in the EUMS, which can be used if necessary. It will support the EU member states in crisis identification and in civilian operations that combine and plan for the civilian and military components. In addition, it will support the national headquarters.

The task of European Defense Agency (EDA) is supporting the member states and coordinating their cooperation in the areas of military research, armaments planning and procurement. This is intended to achieve synergy effects in the form of cost savings, among other things.

The European Union Satellite Center (EUSC) in Torrejón (near Madrid, Spain) observes the earth and creates satellite images and maps, particularly in the service of CSDP. The EUSC therefore plays an important role, especially in conflict prevention and monitoring

The European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Paris produces studies that form the basis for negotiations and decisions in the ESDP.

The East StratCom Task Force (Strategic Communications Team East) of the EU's European External Action Office (EEAS) for Strategic Communications has been active since September 1, 2015 to counter Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns and to draft an action plan on strategic communications. (EuvsDisinformation campaign.) Hybrid warfare combines military with economic means and propaganda in media and social media to fuel tension and sow confusion. Using disinformation as an instrument of hybrid warfare is intended to influence public opinion and undermine the credibility of state institutions. Hybrid actors use the entire spectrum from the targeted control of discussions in social networks to the manipulation or falsification of information on news portals. The "East StratCom Task Force" works together with the NATO Strategic Communication Center of Excellence, exchanges information with it and fights "hybrid" threats together.

Further development:

Since 2016 laid the High Representativein Federica Mogherini - from February 2019th, XNUMX Joseph Borell -- the European Council of Heads of Government a "Global strategy for the foreign and security policy of the European Union" which are reviewed annually in coordination with the Council, the EU Commission and the European Parliament.

The strategy sets 5 priorities;

- the security of the European Union,
- the resilience of states and societies in the eastern and southern neighborhoods of the EU,
- an integrated approach to conflict management,
- regional orders based on cooperation,
- global governance for the 21st century.

In November 2016, HR also presented the Council with an "Implementation Plan for Security and Defense" which included a Coordinated Annual Review on Defense CARD) and new uniform Permanent Structured Cooperation PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), which now includes 46 projects.

At the same time, HR submitted one European action plan in the defense area (European Defense Action Plan, EDAP) before, with suggestions for a European Defense Fund (EDF) with a focus on defense research and capacity building included, which were also implemented.

In 2021 a Strategic compass developed to define and assess the EU's security and defense strategies for the next five to ten years.

Against the background of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, extensive changes were made to the strategic compass to take into account the destabilization of the European security order.

At the meeting of the European Council from 24.-25. The current strategic compass was approved on March 2022 during the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The main objectives are recommendations and solutions in the areas of: crisis management, resilience, capacities and partnerships.

And finally ...

The "defense union" was only a concept, first proposed in 2003 by Joschka Fischer and his French colleague at the time Dominique de Villepin was proposed, but has so far been covered by the "Common Security and Defense Policy", which in turn is regulated differently from the usual community structures (Commission, Parliament, Council).

So far there has been no communitarisation, but the associated actions are very common.

Crisis management missions and operations and the joint permanent cooperation of the armed forces are the most visible and tangible expression of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

However, as a result of the Russian war against Ukraine, a second level within the EU is becoming visible, that of the European Commission.

Actually, the Commission does not have a political mandate in the narrower sense, but the task of monitoring the implementation of and compliance with the EU treaties on the one hand and drafting bills on this basis on the other hand and then submitting them to Parliament and the Council as the two political decision-making bodies submitted for discussion and resolution.

In the development of common positions in the Council, however, since shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU Commission has proven to be the most professional and technically best positioned of the three EU institutions and the most capable of acting in this crisis. It has quickly and purposefully developed the 10 packages of sanctions against Russia so far and has become the driving force behind Ukraine's accession to the EU, although the Council should actually be the leading institution in this matter.

Shortly after the EU decided to break the "taboo" on financing the purchase and supply of arms to Ukraine, the Commission undertook the task of helping member states coordinate and finance their arms supplies.

It was also the first consultation between the European Commission and the government of an active war zone.

These developments seem to be ignoring Parliament.

It is not yet foreseeable how and when these developments of ever-increasing integration and cooperation will lead to a genuine defense union, perhaps with its own central service/ministry and a European armed force/army.

Incidentally, experience and joint efforts to find solutions show how strong and effective the European treaty structures of the EU treaties from 2009 still are, because they repeatedly enable surprising flexible solutions.

The first outlines of a future European Defense Union can be seen from the variety of successful measures and solutions.

However, it is certainly related to the further development of the European Union into an "ever stronger union through deepening and widening" which, according to the ideas of the European federalists of JEF, EUD, UEF and others, should result in a federal European state.

Backgrounds:

PESCO – concrete projects with German participation

So far, 46 active Permanent Structured Cooperation projects have been approved in three project rounds. Overall, they serve to close the capability gaps identified by the European Defense Agency in the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and thus strengthen the EU's ability to act.

The spectrum ranges from the development of underwater drones for combating sea mines to the establishment of a disaster control center and the development of a protection system for ports and sea routes. Other projects include the establishment of a rapid reaction force to defend against cyber attacks or the further development of the Tiger combat helicopter. The core of the projects is that the EU and its member states can act successfully (together) in operations and missions. The basic requirements for this are skills, interoperability, the same standards, training and above all: trust.

For each PESCO project, a participating member state has taken on the coordination.

Germany is currently coordinating six Permanent Structured Cooperation projects:

The construction of one European Medical Commands EMC (European Medical Command) and a project for Improving the crisis response capability of the EU member states EUFOR CROCE, (European Union Force Crisis Response Operation Core). In addition, Germany, together with the project partners, will Set up a Europe-wide network of logistics hubs in order to be able to move troops and material quickly. In addition, Germany has the coordination for the improvement of the geographic, meteorological and oceanographic information support GeoMETOCGeo-Meteorological and Oceanographic (Geo-Meteorological and Oceanographic) of missions and operations as well as for the development of cooperation for the operation and use of the euro drone accepted. In addition, Germany controls the establishment of a center CIDCCC (Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre) for coordinating the exchange of information in the areas of cyber and IT information technology.

The project to coordinate the training of soldiers for EU training missions, the EU TMCC (European Union Training Mission Competence Centre) has now been completed.

What is the relationship between PESCO and NATO?

The military cooperation of the EU members complements that in the North Atlantic defense pact NATO. The two organizations are not in competition with each other. Rather, NATO also benefits from a more effective EU, whose allied members form a militarily strong European pillar in the transatlantic alliance and assume more international responsibility.

Unanimity principle - decisions with qualified majority (BQM) transitional clauses (passerelles)

As a rule, decisions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are taken unanimously.

One way to weaken this principle is to "constructive abstention" (Article 31(1) subparagraph 2 TEU), where a Member State abstains from the unanimous vote and may justify this abstention with a formal declaration. In this case, that Member State is not obliged to implement the decision, but must accept that the decision is binding on the Union and refrain from anything that might contradict or hinder Union action. Likewise, the other Member States should respect the decision of the abstaining Member State.

However, in a number of cases, which are enshrined in Article 31(2) TEU, the qualified majority:

- when the Council adopts a decision establishing an action or a position of the Union, on the basis of a decision of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union pursuant to Article 22;

- if the Council, acting on a proposal submitted to it by the High Representative(s) at the request of the
European Council, acting on its own initiative or on the initiative of the High Representative, adopts a decision establishing an action or a position of the Union;

- when the Council adopts a decision implementing a decision establishing an action or a position of the Union;

- when the Council appoints a special representative under Article 33.

In the TEU, however, two safety precautions are provided to mitigate the qualified majority. The first safety precaution is theemergency brake clause" (Article 31(2) TEU), which allows a formal vote to be avoided when a Member State declares its intention to oppose a qualified majority decision for substantial national policy reasons, which it must also state.

The HR then works with the Member State concerned to find an acceptable solution. If such a solution is not reached, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may arrange for the issue to be referred to the European Council for a unanimous decision.

A second safety precaution is provided for in Article 31(4) TEU, according to which decisions with military implications are exempt from BQM.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

On September 12, 2018, the Commission issued a Communication discussing ways to Passover clause in the field of CFSP apply. The basic idea was to strengthen the role of the EU on the international stage. In his 2018 State of the Union address, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker already called on the EU to "stand on its own two feet" and to strengthen the international role of the euro. The Franco-German Meseberg declaration also called on the EU to speed up and make its decision-making more efficient.

Although successive reforms have introduced qualified majority voting for the majority of policy areas, unanimity remains the rule in the CFSP area.

As explained by the Commission, the main disadvantage of unanimity in the CFSP is that it prevents coherent positions from being reached quickly, on the basis of which the EU can act decisively on the international stage. Therefore, the introduction of qualified majority voting in some areas of the CFSP would have positive effects, as it would allow the EU to act more efficiently from firm and coherent positions and respond to pressing foreign policy challenges. This would also increase the resilience of the EU by protecting member states from being pressured by third countries. The Commission does not claim that all problems in the field of CFSP can be solved with QM alone. However, given the need to balance member states' interests and enforce the EU's position in bilateral relations, QM could lead to some improvements, especially considering that the Council itself can act in policy areas where QM is the norm (e.g. trade), rarely conducts a formal vote and takes decisions by consensus.

Against this background, the Commission has asked Member States to consider cases where QoM could have a positive impact and offer added value.

The Council has asked the Commission not to agree on common positions on CFSP or related matters when the instruments provided for by the Treaty could be used for this purpose.

In addition, the Commission has asked the Council not to apply the CFSP legal framework to external aspects of policies governed by the TFEU, thus abusing the unanimity principle.
The Commission has also recommended the use of the passerelle clause in the following three areas:

- Human rights in multilateral fora
Given that human rights are universal and indivisible and that the Union needs to stand united while striving for political unity and credibility as a soft power, the Commission has recommended that EU positions to be communicated in international fora, which are currently being decided by consensus, instead determined by qualified majority. For example, the Commission has proposed that the European Council adopt a decision, based on Article 31(3) TEU, whereby the Council decides on EU positions on human rights issues in international fora by qualified majority.

- Issuance and amendment of sanction regulations.
Sanctions are a very powerful tool that the EU can use to reinforce its foreign and security policy agenda. Against this background, these restrictive measures have been used frequently in recent years to prevent, stop and influence foreign policy developments and to exert economic and political pressure. In the case of changes to the lists of EU restrictive measures decided by the United Nations or – if the changes were not politically explosive – by the EU itself, the Council has already decided by a qualified majority. However, the Commission has recommended that QM under Article 31(3) TEU be applied at all times and that the European Council unanimously adopt a decision whereby the Council decides on the setting of sanctioning regimes by qualified majority.

- Civil Common Security and Defense Policy
Common Security and Defense Policy civilian missions are an important tool that the EU can use to respond to and engage in post-crisis crises to support national authorities and local communities. In order to be able to overcome the challenges, however, they must be used quickly. In a difficult political environment that is constantly changing, effective and agile management becomes the decisive factor.

On the basis of Article 31(3) TEU, the Commission has proposed that the European Council adopt decisions providing for all decisions relating to the civilian Common Security and Defense Policy to be adopted by qualified majority.

The Commission has proposed starting missions for rule of law capacity building and security sector reforms, as these are linked to other instruments that are also decided by qualified majority.

Heinrich Kümmerle reacted to this post.

#2 March 5, 2023, 12:28 p.m

... by the way, a current Euractiv article goes in a similar direction:

https://www.euractiv.de/section/europa-kompakt/news/wie-der-ukraine-krieg-die-institutionelle-balance-der-eu-veraendert/

#3 March 29, 2023, 11:41 p.m

I'm happy to post an answer here Daniel Caspary MEPs who send an email (24.03.2023/17/57 XNUMX:XNUMX CET) directly to peter schulze was sent.

Dear Mr. Schulze,
Thank you for your message of March 8, 2023. I read your blog post on the European Defense Union with interest.

They describe the structure of the common foreign and security policy and quote a frequently voiced criticism with reference to the unanimity principle. In fact, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has partly put the premises of European foreign and security policy in a different light; it has become clear that the European Union must be able to act quickly in foreign policy.

However, I do not agree with you that the European Commission and the European Parliament only have consultation and information rights here. Similar to health policy during the corona pandemic, the European Commission is very successful in guiding coordination processes and making them more efficient and productive. In the case of the current situation, this is reflected in the planning of joint deliveries of ammunition to Ukraine. As they are in the current reporting (see here) the proposals come from High Representative Josep Borrell and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

Topics are also repeatedly put on the agenda in the European Parliament, for example concrete sanctions against Russia in the resolutions of the European Parliament of March, April, May, October and November 2022, as well as recently from 02. February 2023. Such joint coordination processes are essential in order to avoid national unilateralism in the common foreign and security policy.

I hope I was able to help you with this information and I am happy to remain at your disposal as a contact person.

Stay healthy!

Best regards ...
Daniel Caspary.

peter schulze I, too, would be very pleased if both statements would now lead to a corresponding discussion here in the forum.

#4 April 11, 2023, 19:02 p.m

Posted by peter schulze on Apr 11, 2023 at 19:02 p.m
Dear Mr Caspary,

I am very pleased to receive your detailed reply on the subject of "A European Defense Union".

I.

In fact, when it comes to defense and security policy, the Treaties see the European Parliament and the European Commission more as consultation and information partners:

Article 36 TEU reads:
< hört the European Parliament regularly on the most important aspects and the fundamental decisions of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defense policy and unterrichtet it about policy developments in these areas. He ensures that the views of the European Parliament due consideration become. The special representatives can be called upon to inform the European Parliament. The European Parliament may make requests or recommendations to the Council and the High Representative to target. It conducts one twice a year Aussprache on progress made in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defense policy.>>

A direct codecision or other active participation - with an express possibility for the Commission see eg Art. 40, 42 (4) TEU - is not intended.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0020.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

The parliamentary resolutions you mentioned certainly make recommendations:

March 2022 on EU citizenship in exchange for financial investments,

April 2022 on EU sanctions against Russia,

November 2022 on travel restrictions for Russian citizens,

October 2222 on the Russian escalation in the war of aggression against Ukraine,

February 2023 for the EU-Ukraine Summit,

but these do not include any new structural considerations or recommendations towards a more efficient and effective EU security and defense policy.

In a resolution of the European Parliament of May 2022, I had hoped that basic ideas or recommendations for (treaty) changes would be presented here under the title “Strengthening the EU’s ability to act”, but this was not the case.

When it comes to the question of the "principle of unanimity" in foreign and security policy, I am not referring to the "general" criticism under the rather generalizing "no veto" motto, but rather to the descriptions in a study by the European Parliament, from 2020 on the application of passerelle clauses in the EU treaties.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/659420/EPRS_STU(2020)659420_DE.pdf

The study gives a very good overview of the unanimity rules and the possibilities of transitional clauses (passerelles) from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV).

The detailed proposals of the Commission -- see pp. 44-56 -- are also presented here in detail, which Parliament also "welcomed" in a resolution of March 26, 2019.

But I am not aware of any further and more far-reaching active proposals from Parliament, specifically for unanimity in defense and security policy.

I think that in these -- relatively few -- cases of unanimity in security and defense policy, the individual "facts" must be considered very carefully; the principle of a "parliamentary army and parliamentary reservation" that applies in Germany -- for good reasons -- encounters different types of decision-making powers in Europe that entrench military decisions much more with presidents and governments. A decision with a qualified majority, in which Germany could also be outvoted, must therefore be considered very carefully.

II.

The formulation of a "due consideration of the European Parliament" shows "similarities" to the procedure for the election of the President of the European Commission according to the current Art. 17 Para. 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the discussions about the "Prize Candidates Principle".

Art. 17 (7) TEU reads:

>> The European Council proposes a candidate for the post of President of the Commission to the European Parliament after appropriate consultations by a qualified majority; included considered he the result of the elections to the European Parliament. The European Parliament elects this candidate with a majority of its members. If this candidate does not obtain a majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, will propose a new candidate to the European Parliament within one month, for whose election the European Parliament follows the same procedure.<

However, the so-called "Spitzenkandidaten" procedure is not mentioned in the EU treaties. When it was first used in 2014, it was primarily an agreement between EU leaders in the European Council, the European Parliament and the European political parties on the interpretation of the wording in the Treaties.

The EU Parliament can currently ultimately elect the President of the Commission, but only after the heads of state and government have submitted a proposal to him. And the heads of government of the countries do not necessarily have to propose a top candidate, but can -- as in the case Ursula von der Leyens happen -- also put someone else up for election.

Since the leading candidate principle has not yet been firmly anchored in the EU treaty, it is currently still possible to circumvent this model, which was introduced as a kind of customary law.

Here, however, the European Parliament has already gone a step further - compared to the question of the defense union.

According to the will of the European Parliament, the gradual constitutional change is now to be consolidated via an electoral law reform so that it will be binding in the future. On May 3, 2022, the European Parliament will have EU electoral law reforms voted on, which include, among other things, the top candidate principle.

After the German Bundestag initially postponed the consultations on March 16, 2023 on the proposal of the European Parliament, on Thursday, March 30, 2023, motions from the SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and FDP (20/5990) and the AfD (20/6005) on the election of the European Parliament.

Following the debate, MEPs referred both motions to the Committee on European Union Affairs for further deliberation. Even if the parliamentary groups still see a need for political and legal clarification on individual issues, such as the fundamentally planned gender parity (?) or the design of a common European election day, they would generally welcome the Parliament's proposals of May 3, 2022, write the MEPs.

https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw11-de-eu-wahlrecht-937914

https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw13-de-europaeisches-parlament-938390

If the top candidate principle were to apply in European elections, the heads of government of the countries would lose power because they could no longer allocate the most important posts in the EU on their own.

However, this would be a step in the direction of an EU that is closer to the citizens, more democracy-friendly and, with the prior determination of top candidates, also more personal.

To do this, however, all member states would first have to unanimously agree to an electoral law reform at the level of the EU Council of Ministers, which would then have to be transposed into national law by the member states.

At the European level, however, there are considerable doubts as to whether the governments of the member states have a real interest in pushing ahead with reforms and changes to EU electoral law.

https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/widerstand-gegen-neues-eu-wahlrecht-18396291.html

https://www.euractiv.de/section/wahlen-und-macht/news/transnationale-listen-rat-blockiert-eu-wahlrechtsreform/

These are just 2 examples of the many fundamental questions about the necessary further development of the European Union. In their complexity, however, they also show the difficulties with which the elected representatives of the citizens in parliament have to deal and answer to their voters.

I am therefore looking forward to further exchange, discussions and your perspectives on these as well as the other diverse European topics and remain with friendly European greetings

peter schulze

Chairman Europa-Union Mannheim

PS

Two additional attachments:

Dear Mr Caspary,

I am very pleased to receive your detailed reply on the subject of "A European Defense Union".

In fact, when it comes to defense and security policy, the Treaties see the European Parliament and the European Commission more as consultation and information partners:

Article 36 TEU reads:
< hört the European Parliament regularly on the most important aspects and the fundamental decisions of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defense policy and unterrichtet it about policy developments in these areas. He ensures that the views of the European Parliament due consideration become. The special representatives can be called upon to inform the European Parliament. The European Parliament may make requests or recommendations to the Council and the High Representative to target. It conducts one twice a year Aussprache on progress made in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy, including the common security and defense policy.>>

A direct codecision or other active participation - with an express possibility for the Commission see eg Art. 40, 42 (4) TEU - is not intended.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0020.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

The parliamentary resolutions you mentioned certainly make recommendations:

March 2022 on EU citizenship in exchange for financial investments,
April 2022 on EU sanctions against Russia,
November 2022 on travel restrictions for Russian citizens,
October 2222 on the Russian escalation in the war of aggression against Ukraine,
February 2023 for the EU-Ukraine Summit,

but these do not include any new structural considerations or recommendations towards a more efficient and effective EU security and defense policy.

In a resolution of the European Parliament of May 2022, I had hoped that basic ideas or recommendations for (treaty) changes would be presented here under the title “Strengthening the EU’s ability to act”, but this was not the case.

When it comes to the question of the "principle of unanimity" in foreign and security policy, I am not referring to the "general" criticism under the rather generalizing "no veto" motto, but rather to the descriptions in a study by the European Parliament, from 2020 on the application of passerelle clauses in the EU treaties.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/659420/EPRS_STU(2020)659420_DE.pdf

The study gives a very good overview of the unanimity rules and the possibilities of transitional clauses (passerelles) from unanimity to qualified majority voting (QMV).

The detailed proposals of the Commission -- see pp. 44-56 -- are also presented here in detail, which Parliament also "welcomed" in a resolution of March 26, 2019.

But I am not aware of any further and more far-reaching active proposals from Parliament, specifically for unanimity in defense and security policy.

I think that in these -- relatively few -- cases of unanimity in security and defense policy, the individual "facts" must be considered very carefully; the principle of a "parliamentary army and parliamentary reservation" that applies in Germany -- for good reasons -- encounters different types of decision-making powers in Europe that entrench military decisions much more with presidents and governments. A decision with a qualified majority, in which Germany could also be outvoted, must therefore be considered very carefully.

II.

The formulation of a "due consideration of the European Parliament" shows "similarities" to the procedure for the election of the President of the European Commission according to the current Art. 17 Para. 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the discussions about the "Prize Candidates Principle".

Art. 17 (7) TEU reads:

>> The European Council proposes a candidate for the post of President of the Commission to the European Parliament after appropriate consultations by a qualified majority; included considered he the result of the elections to the European Parliament. The European Parliament elects this candidate with a majority of its members. If this candidate does not obtain a majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, will propose a new candidate to the European Parliament within one month, for whose election the European Parliament follows the same procedure.<

However, the so-called "Spitzenkandidaten" procedure is not mentioned in the EU treaties. When it was first used in 2014, it was primarily an agreement between EU leaders in the European Council, the European Parliament and the European political parties on the interpretation of the wording in the Treaties.

The EU Parliament can currently ultimately elect the President of the Commission, but only after the heads of state and government have submitted a proposal to him. And the heads of government of the countries do not necessarily have to propose a top candidate, but can -- as in the case Ursula von der Leyens happen -- also put someone else up for election.

Since the leading candidate principle has not yet been firmly anchored in the EU treaty, it is currently still possible to circumvent this model, which was introduced as a kind of customary law.

Here, however, the European Parliament has already gone a step further - compared to the question of the defense union.

According to the will of the European Parliament, the gradual constitutional change is now to be consolidated via an electoral law reform so that it will be binding in the future. On May 3, 2022, the European Parliament will have EU electoral law reforms voted on, which include, among other things, the top candidate principle.

After the German Bundestag initially postponed the consultations on March 16, 2023 on the proposal of the European Parliament, on Thursday, March 30, 2023, motions from the SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and FDP (20/5990) and the AfD (20/6005) on the election of the European Parliament.

Following the debate, MEPs referred both motions to the Committee on European Union Affairs for further deliberation. Even if the parliamentary groups still see a need for political and legal clarification on individual issues, such as the fundamentally planned gender parity (?) or the design of a common European election day, they would generally welcome the Parliament's proposals of May 3, 2022, write the MEPs.

https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw11-de-eu-wahlrecht-937914

https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw13-de-europaeisches-parlament-938390

If the top candidate principle were to apply in European elections, the heads of government of the countries would lose power because they could no longer allocate the most important posts in the EU on their own.

However, this would be a step in the direction of an EU that is closer to the citizens, more democracy-friendly and, with the prior determination of top candidates, also more personal.

To do this, however, all member states would first have to unanimously agree to an electoral law reform at the level of the EU Council of Ministers, which would then have to be transposed into national law by the member states.

At the European level, however, there are considerable doubts as to whether the governments of the member states have a real interest in pushing ahead with reforms and changes to EU electoral law.

https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/widerstand-gegen-neues-eu-wahlrecht-18396291.html

https://www.euractiv.de/section/wahlen-und-macht/news/transnationale-listen-rat-blockiert-eu-wahlrechtsreform/

These are just 2 examples of the many fundamental questions about the necessary further development of the European Union. In their complexity, however, they also show the difficulties with which the elected representatives of the citizens in parliament have to deal and answer to their voters.

I am therefore looking forward to further exchange, discussions and your perspectives on these as well as the other diverse European topics and remain with friendly European greetings

peter schulze

Chairman Europa-Union Mannheim

Two additional attachments:

Uploaded files:

You must be logged in to access uploads.

#5 April 21, 2023, 11:26 p.m

In their Policy Brief No. 3 from April 2023 Sergio Fabbrini, Andrea Capati, Dora Hegedus and Titian Zgaga three possible models of a future EU to determine which can best respond to the challenges of the Russian attack on Ukraine.

They come to the conclusion -- which is completely understandable for us European federalists -- that only a European federal state is capable of countering Russian aggression.

Summary

Which models of EU politics for dealing with the Russian war can be derived from the Conference on the Future of Europe? Considering the 'Report on the Final Outcome' of the Conference, we traced three models: the parliamentary union, the intergovernmental union and the economic community. Because they appear unable to deal with the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this policy brief outlines the contours of an alternative model, the federal union.

Here you can find the article ...

#6 June 5, 2023 at 23:07 am

Posted by Heinrich Kuemmerle on Jun 5, 2023 at 23:07 am
The discussion continues and so I can put the further correspondence online again:

peter schulzepeter.schulze@eubw.eu> 10 May 2023 09:53

Dear Mr Caspary,

In his "principle" speech on Europe Day 2023 in front of the European Parliament, Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz "left open" the direction in which he sees the further development of the European Union and more of "the establishment of a Geopolitical European Union"spoken. (besides the already known terms like a "enlarged and reformed European Union open to the future)

He pointed out that he sees a "driving force" in the European Parliament.

In connection with our exchange, it would of course be interesting to know whether there were corresponding initiatives and preparations by the EP to "Foundation of a geopolitical union" or whether this term is just a new "title" for the continuation of efforts in the still existing framework?

Best European regards

peter schulze

Chairman Europa-Union Mannheim

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/rede-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-im-rahmen-der-diskussionsreihe-this-is-europe-im-europaeischen-parlament-am-9-mai-2023-in-strassburg-2189408

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASPARY Daniel wrote on 18.05.2023/15/32 XNUMX:XNUMX CEST:

Dear Mr. Schulze,

Thank you for your renewed letter of May 10, 2023. To make my explanations easier to understand, I am enclosing an anthology and an article.

Of course you are right, the European Union's foreign and security policy is primarily intergovernmental, ie the basic decision-making powers lie with the member states. This is so formally stated in the treaties. Nevertheless, the contractually stipulated principle of one uniform Positioning. This results in room for maneuver for greater integration of decision-making. However, in order to understand the influence of the European Commission and the European Parliament, it makes sense to look beyond the formal rights. Finally, there are support services, particularly on the part of the European Commission, which enhance the role of the Commission. I recommend that you read the chapter "The common foreign and security policy as a reflection of a changing integration process" by Franco Algieri from the anthology attached here (Algieri, Franco (2020): The common foreign and security policy as a reflection of a changing integration process. 951-974 In: H. Lippert (ed.): Handbuch der Europäische Union, Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-17409-5_29).

There the author writes: "The European Council defines the strategic interests and objectives of the EU and takes decisions, acting unanimously on the recommendation of the Council. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission can submit joint proposals to the Council (Art. 22 TEU). The former is responsible for the CFSP and the Commission for the other areas of external action, e.g. B. foreign trade. [...] The High Representative was [before the Lisbon Treaty] the EU's chief diplomat, but relied on the resources made available by the Commission. With the Lisbon Treaty, there was a far-reaching redefinition of this office and its competencies. The newly created double function as High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission should be emphasized. The responsibilities and the role of this actor in the power structures of EU foreign policy were thus upgraded. [...] The European Parliament (EP) supports the CFSP in principle, but has only limited co-creation power in this policy area. Of particular relevance is the regular hearing of the European Parliament by the High Representative. Furthermore, he has to inform the latter about the development of foreign and security policy. Parliament, in turn, can address questions and recommendations to the Council and High Representative (Art. 36 TEU). Due to its budget competence, the EP is involved in the approval of the CFSP budget. In addition, international agreements concluded by the EU require the approval of Parliament." (Algiers 2020: 958, 960-961).

There is also an overview chapter on security and defense policy in the same compendium. The scientific literature speaks of informal power with reference to the possibilities of influence that go beyond the formal contractual powers. This is exemplified in this study (also attached): Riddervold, M. & Rosén G. (2016) Trick and treat: how the Commission and the European Parliament exert influence in EU foreign and security policies, Journal of European Integration, 38: 6, 687-702, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1178737.

As you rightly state, the demands of the European Parliament mostly relate to the content of foreign and security policy and defense policy. This is because the formal framework already mentioned above is set by the contracts and no change is currently foreseeable. Nevertheless, accents can also be set here that clearly speak for more integration. In 2020, Parliament took one resolution to implement the common security and defense policy. In the "strong conviction that Europe's strategic autonomy should also include the ability to deploy armed forces on the periphery of the EU", Parliament called for "increasing steps to be taken towards a common defense policy [...] and ultimately a common defence become". In its resolution of March 2022 on the implementation of the common security and defense policy, Parliament spoke out in favor of the Strategic Compass and the intended creation of a "rapid reaction force". The Strategic compass in turn uses the contractual possibilities of a Europeanization of foreign policy, this is also expressly supported by the European Parliament.

I hope I was able to help you with this information and I am happy to remain at your disposal as a contact person.

With kind regards,

Daniel Caspary.

Member of the European Parliament

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

peter schulze 31.5.2023 15:19

-----and it (EP) moves (somewhat)........

Dear Mr Caspary,

Thank you for the extensive yet detailed response and continuation of our "discussion", which is being followed closely by some of our members who are interested in the topic of EU security and foreign policy and their further development.

The initial question was how the European Parliament envisages further development, or whether it is satisfied with the options available within the existing treaties (TFEU, TEU). ?

As you rightly point out, "The European Parliament (EP) supports the CFSP in principle, but has only one in this policy area more restricted co-creational power. Of particular relevance is the regular hearing of the European Parliament by the High Representative. Furthermore, he has to inform the latter about the development of foreign and security policy. Parliament, in turn, can address questions and recommendations to the Council and High Representative (Art. 36 TEU). Due to its budget competence, the EP is involved in the approval of the CFSP budget. In addition, international agreements concluded by the EU require the approval of Parliament."

The "formal framework is set by the contracts and no changes are currently foreseeable.

But the "Possibilities of influence of the parliament are rather of informal macht that go beyond the formal contractual powers,.......

So I was all the more surprised by the recent press release from the European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) on May 24, which clearly shows that the EP has been actively involved in this issue and has agreed to recommendations that -

- in the short term, in connection with the Russian war in Ukraine, the Green Deal and the revision of the long-term EU budget, the unused potential of the bridging clauses of the treaties should be used without avoiding the questions of changing the treaties,

- the EU treaties are to be reviewed in this respect so that the decision on the application of the bridging clauses (change from the principle of unanimity to decision-making with a qualified majority) does not require unanimity.

- this change should be gradual, gradual

in the short term by the end of 2023, in the medium term by the end of 2024 and in the long term after the 2024 EP elections.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230522IPR91613/passerelle-mechanism-the-key-for-a-more-effective-and-flexible-eu

to the passerelles "Bridge" Clauses

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN-DE/TXT/?from=EN&uri=LEGISSUM%3Apasserelle_clauses

The recommendations are scheduled for vote in the plenary of the European Parliament during the July part-session in Strasbourg, which will then be called "Recommendations go to the Council and High Representative (Art. 36 TEU)" for further development.

And finally ...

With these recommendations, the European Parliament still reacted within a reasonable amount of time to the proposals of the Conference on the Future of Europe, even if not, as some had hoped and desired, with a strong movement towards fundamental treaty changes with which the more active roles that had been practiced for a long time be legally documented and confirmed by the European Commission and Parliament in the contracts.

At least there is hope that this is a first effective step towards a stronger and more sovereign European Union.

As citizens involved in the Europa-Union, we are excited about these further steps and will follow the developments with great interest.

Best European regards

peter schulze

Chairman Europa-Union Mannheim

The discussion continues and so I can put the further correspondence online again:

peter schulzepeter.schulze@eubw.eu> 10 May 2023 09:53

Dear Mr Caspary,

In his "principle" speech on Europe Day 2023 in front of the European Parliament, Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz "left open" the direction in which he sees the further development of the European Union and more of "the establishment of a Geopolitical European Union"spoken. (besides the already known terms like a "enlarged and reformed European Union open to the future)

He pointed out that he sees a "driving force" in the European Parliament.

In connection with our exchange, it would of course be interesting to know whether there were corresponding initiatives and preparations by the EP to "Foundation of a geopolitical union" or whether this term is just a new "title" for the continuation of efforts in the still existing framework?

Best European regards

peter schulze

Chairman Europa-Union Mannheim

https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/rede-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-im-rahmen-der-diskussionsreihe-this-is-europe-im-europaeischen-parlament-am-9-mai-2023-in-strassburg-2189408

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

CASPARY Daniel wrote on 18.05.2023/15/32 XNUMX:XNUMX CEST:

Dear Mr. Schulze,

Thank you for your renewed letter of May 10, 2023. To make my explanations easier to understand, I am enclosing an anthology and an article.

Of course you are right, the European Union's foreign and security policy is primarily intergovernmental, ie the basic decision-making powers lie with the member states. This is so formally stated in the treaties. Nevertheless, the contractually stipulated principle of one uniform Positioning. This results in room for maneuver for greater integration of decision-making. However, in order to understand the influence of the European Commission and the European Parliament, it makes sense to look beyond the formal rights. Finally, there are support services, particularly on the part of the European Commission, which enhance the role of the Commission. I recommend that you read the chapter "The common foreign and security policy as a reflection of a changing integration process" by Franco Algieri from the anthology attached here (Algieri, Franco (2020): The common foreign and security policy as a reflection of a changing integration process. 951-974 In: H. Lippert (ed.): Handbuch der Europäische Union, Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden, DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-17409-5_29).

There the author writes: "The European Council defines the strategic interests and objectives of the EU and takes decisions, acting unanimously on the recommendation of the Council. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission can submit joint proposals to the Council (Art. 22 TEU). The former is responsible for the CFSP and the Commission for the other areas of external action, e.g. B. foreign trade. [...] The High Representative was [before the Lisbon Treaty] the EU's chief diplomat, but relied on the resources made available by the Commission. With the Lisbon Treaty, there was a far-reaching redefinition of this office and its competencies. The newly created double function as High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission should be emphasized. The responsibilities and the role of this actor in the power structures of EU foreign policy were thus upgraded. [...] The European Parliament (EP) supports the CFSP in principle, but has only limited co-creation power in this policy area. Of particular relevance is the regular hearing of the European Parliament by the High Representative. Furthermore, he has to inform the latter about the development of foreign and security policy. Parliament, in turn, can address questions and recommendations to the Council and High Representative (Art. 36 TEU). Due to its budget competence, the EP is involved in the approval of the CFSP budget. In addition, international agreements concluded by the EU require the approval of Parliament." (Algiers 2020: 958, 960-961).

There is also an overview chapter on security and defense policy in the same compendium. The scientific literature speaks of informal power with reference to the possibilities of influence that go beyond the formal contractual powers. This is exemplified in this study (also attached): Riddervold, M. & Rosén G. (2016) Trick and treat: how the Commission and the European Parliament exert influence in EU foreign and security policies, Journal of European Integration, 38: 6, 687-702, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2016.1178737.

As you rightly state, the demands of the European Parliament mostly relate to the content of foreign and security policy and defense policy. This is because the formal framework already mentioned above is set by the contracts and no change is currently foreseeable. Nevertheless, accents can also be set here that clearly speak for more integration. In 2020, Parliament took one resolution to implement the common security and defense policy. In the "strong conviction that Europe's strategic autonomy should also include the ability to deploy armed forces on the periphery of the EU", Parliament called for "increasing steps to be taken towards a common defense policy [...] and ultimately a common defence become". In its resolution of March 2022 on the implementation of the common security and defense policy, Parliament spoke out in favor of the Strategic Compass and the intended creation of a "rapid reaction force". The Strategic compass in turn uses the contractual possibilities of a Europeanization of foreign policy, this is also expressly supported by the European Parliament.

I hope I was able to help you with this information and I am happy to remain at your disposal as a contact person.

With kind regards,

Daniel Caspary.

Member of the European Parliament

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

peter schulze 31.5.2023 15:19

-----and it (EP) moves (somewhat)........

Dear Mr Caspary,

Thank you for the extensive yet detailed response and continuation of our "discussion", which is being followed closely by some of our members who are interested in the topic of EU security and foreign policy and their further development.

The initial question was how the European Parliament envisages further development, or whether it is satisfied with the options available within the existing treaties (TFEU, TEU). ?

As you rightly point out, "The European Parliament (EP) supports the CFSP in principle, but has only one in this policy area more restricted co-creational power. Of particular relevance is the regular hearing of the European Parliament by the High Representative. Furthermore, he has to inform the latter about the development of foreign and security policy. Parliament, in turn, can address questions and recommendations to the Council and High Representative (Art. 36 TEU). Due to its budget competence, the EP is involved in the approval of the CFSP budget. In addition, international agreements concluded by the EU require the approval of Parliament."

The "formal framework is set by the contracts and no changes are currently foreseeable.

But the "Possibilities of influence of the parliament are rather of informal macht that go beyond the formal contractual powers,.......

So I was all the more surprised by the recent press release from the European Parliament's Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) on May 24, which clearly shows that the EP has been actively involved in this issue and has agreed to recommendations that -

- in the short term, in connection with the Russian war in Ukraine, the Green Deal and the revision of the long-term EU budget, the unused potential of the bridging clauses of the treaties should be used without avoiding the questions of changing the treaties,

- the EU treaties are to be reviewed in this respect so that the decision on the application of the bridging clauses (change from the principle of unanimity to decision-making with a qualified majority) does not require unanimity.

- this change should be gradual, gradual

in the short term by the end of 2023, in the medium term by the end of 2024 and in the long term after the 2024 EP elections.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20230522IPR91613/passerelle-mechanism-the-key-for-a-more-effective-and-flexible-eu

to the passerelles "Bridge" Clauses

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN-DE/TXT/?from=EN&uri=LEGISSUM%3Apasserelle_clauses

The recommendations are scheduled for vote in the plenary of the European Parliament during the July part-session in Strasbourg, which will then be called "Recommendations go to the Council and High Representative (Art. 36 TEU)" for further development.

And finally ...

With these recommendations, the European Parliament still reacted within a reasonable amount of time to the proposals of the Conference on the Future of Europe, even if not, as some had hoped and desired, with a strong movement towards fundamental treaty changes with which the more active roles that had been practiced for a long time be legally documented and confirmed by the European Commission and Parliament in the contracts.

At least there is hope that this is a first effective step towards a stronger and more sovereign European Union.

As citizens involved in the Europa-Union, we are excited about these further steps and will follow the developments with great interest.

Best European regards

peter schulze

Chairman Europa-Union Mannheim

Page views: 3.809 | Today: 13 | Counting since October 22.10.2023, XNUMX

Addition: Inflation is stronger than before the euro?

No. The euro has been around for 25 years. On average, the Eurosystem (ECB + national central banks) achieved the inflation target significantly better between 1999 and 2020 than was the case before. The phase of current inflation as a result of the Corona crisis and the supply bottlenecks and the energy crisis has driven up prices worldwide in 2021 and 2022. Inflation has been falling continuously since the end of 2022 and is approaching 2% again.
In addition, the common currency has given Europe stability in various crises.
The common currency supports the domestic market and has helped Germany achieve strong export performance.

Heinrich Kuemmerle says:

January 9, 2024 at 8:37 am

Thank you, I have posted your post in the relevant forum. I would also be happy to unlock you for the forum, so you can also actively participate there.

I would like to add to the minutes of the “Europe Now!” discussion group that we participants also debated how “natural” Europe has become, especially for us younger people. Many of us don't know any different. Travel without borders, pay in euros, no customs fees when shopping online, we hardly know any other way. It is important to demonstrate these freedoms in order to arouse interest in Europe.
Likewise, the majority of the group agreed that we are not afraid, but rather feel concern and uncertainty when we observe current developments.

Heinrich Kuemmerle says:

October 21, 2023 at 22:08 am

Dear Semin, this addition actually belongs as an answer under the post: https://kuemmerle.name/foren/topic/protokolle-7-hertensteiner-gespraeche#postid-291 by Walther Heipertz. You can find this option as “Answers” immediately to the right below each forum post.

The good thing about it is that everyone involved in the post will then receive a reference to your corresponding answer.

This comment function here is intended for the 'general' of the forum.

Would be a topic for the next round on January 18.1.2023th, XNUMX, right? It's no good if we fill it up alone 😉

Heinrich Kuemmerle says:

February 23, 2023 at 8:23 am

As we were able to determine, the half-life of such rounds is not sufficient to fill a forum even remotely. Where non-binding has become a principle, you really have to think about completely new communication channels.

Blogger achievement unlocked! 🏆
My German is rusty, but someone has described my personal site not just as dangerous, but *VERY* dangerous! 😊
#Bucketlist
kuemmerle.name/foren/topic/ch…