The new US President – ​​Challenges for Europe

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In the new issue of Europa aktiv (No. 1/2021) there is an article worth reading with the headline “Europe, China and the USA“. The two authors deal with exactly the same topic that I took up in my contribution.  

By the time Europa aktiv got to me, I was pretty much done with my text; I could therefore no longer install the EUD article. But I would like to point this out.

The new US President – ​​Challenges for Europe

In this forum post, I want to revisit some of the questions I asked in my earlier post "America is back – But where are the Republicans going?“ of February 27.2.2020th, 19. For the virtual Munich Security Conference on February XNUMXth Joe Biden informed the allies that with his assumption of the presidency in foreign policy diplomacy and mutual coordination would be in the foreground again. "America is back!" he had announced to the great relief of the allies. Even before the Munich conference, Biden announced on February 4, in a speech at the State Department in Washington, that he would strengthen the powers of diplomacy, which had been neglected in recent years. Biden promised to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the allies and to fight for democracy and human rights from a “position of strength” (quotes from the Heilbronner Voice, February 6.2.21th, XNUMX: “Comeback of diplomacy”).

How much Biden's foreign policy approach differs from that of his predecessor is illustrated by a quote from an op-ed in the Süddeutsche Zeitung: "In Trump's world, alliance commitments were reduced to what can be quantified in dollars. Biden will demand much more from Germany than delivering on the old promise to increase defense costs" (comment by Daniel Brossler: "No more muddling through", sueddeutsche.de 21.1.21). However, Biden should expect this not only from Germany but also from the European Union. Before I go into more detail about these challenges for Europe – they are also opportunities – two examples should illustrate how much the atmosphere in the American administration has changed since Biden himself took office; but also what threats his predecessor Trump and his party could pose to the new foreign policy. 

Towards the end of my 27.2.21/XNUMX/XNUMX post, I described the Pentagon's distrust of the Trump White House and reported how the military in the Pentagon - with the knowledge and approval of the Secretary of Defense at the time Mark T Esper - Failed to pass two very special requests for promotion to the White House. The problem with those applications was that they were for the promotion of two highly qualified women to the highest military ranks. But it was known from previous experience that Trump and his staff were very reluctant to promote women.

The "new" White House turned the process, which was so problematic in Trump's time, into a public appearance for Joe Biden in the white house. This occurred just on International Women's Day (March 8.3.2021, XNUMX) together with the two women, General Jacqueline Van Ovost and Lieutenant General Laura Richardson in front of the cameras and declared: "It's my great honor to serve as your Commander-in-Chief". The first female vice president of the United States Kamala Harris, the daughter of an immigrant from India and an immigrant from Jamaica. Besides Lloyd Austin, the first black United States Secretary of Defense. It was just fitting, and Biden has addressed this, that four-star General Van Ovost, the second woman in US Armed Forces history to lead a Combat Command, is the daughter of Dutch immigrants. Biden announced at the White House ceremony that he would now forward the two promotion requests to the Senate. The fact that he publicly acknowledged the two candidates before they were approved by the Senate shows that the matter is "over". Biden could not have explained the change of style in the White House better.  

I want to introduce the second example with a question: How much can the European allies rely on the “new” foreign policy? Or vice versa: How great is the danger that should the Republicans regain power, the return of diplomacy and mutual coordination will be shelved? The following is about the Corona aid package (American Rescue Plan) recently passed in the US Congress and signed by President Biden in the amount of 1,9 trillion dollars (about 1,6 trillion euros), at first glance a domestic political issue the American. But on closer inspection - especially if you look at the delaying tactics of the Republicans in the Senate and their consistent voting behavior in both houses of Congress - this does not bode well for foreign policy either. Allies rejoiced in Biden's "America is back!" But they also have to take into account that Trump's Republicans are still counting on "America first!".

The details of the American Rescue Plan will not be expanded upon here – about 70 percent of Americans support it and Joe Biden has repeatedly advocated making the rescue package a bipartisan project. However, when ten Republican politicians offered him a compromise proposal for around $618 billion at a round of talks in the White House - only about a third of what Biden was seeking - it became clear that bipartisanship, the cooperation of both parties, was not achievable in this project was. In order to delay the passage of the rescue plan, the Republican senators proposed a number of amendments and as a senator Ron Johnson from Wisconsin requested that the entire legal text of more than 600 pages be read word for word, it became perfectly clear that the Republicans' primary concern was to keep their ranks united. In the final vote in the House of Representatives - strictly according to party affiliation - there were 200 "yes" and 211 "no" votes. Not a single Republican congressman or senator voted for the rescue plan. "Bipartisanship is Dead" was the headline of the New York Times. There will be no honeymoon period for the new president; more ugly clashes were to be expected (New York Times 6/7.3.21/XNUMX: “After Stimulus Victory in Senate, Reality Sinks in: Bipartisanship Is Dead”). The Republican Party is still trapped by Donald Trump.

Describes what this can mean for American foreign policy Mario Telo, Professor of International Relations at the Université de Bruxelles and the University LUISS in Rome: “Joe Biden and Kamala Harris will be forced to reach a difficult internal bipartisan consensus and will therefore inevitably have very limited and little time to seek solidarity with their external allies and partners. It is these internal factors that will weigh most heavily on the new foreign policy" (Mario Telo: "The new US President and his limits" in Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte No. ½, p. 25 ff).  

Wrote on 7.1.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX, the day after the storming of the Capitol Nicholas Richter in a comment in the Süddeutsche Zeitung: “The USA has come dangerously close to a civil war. Trump will leave soon, but the hatred he stirred up will remain - and continue to threaten the political system" (sueddeutsche.de 7.1.21: "The pillars of democracy seem fragile"; commentary by Nicholas Richter). The fake patriots of January 6, 2021 will continue to nurture their notions of "Make America Great Again." Foreign policy, which is based on cooperation and partnership with the allies, will also have a hard time after Trump.  

Now it's Europe's turn

After Biden's call "America is back!" there can only be one answer from Europe: "Europe is ready!" As far as I can see, most politicians, scientists, journalists and interested citizens repeatedly emphasize that after the change of power in the USA it is essential to develop a viable concept for Europe. How should the EU be further developed internally, towards the United States of Europe? And how do the 27 member states want to position themselves together in terms of foreign policy and world politics?  

Below are some of those statements:  

Europa-Union Germany and Young European Federalists:
“Europe, independent of the US, must take more responsibility for its security and strive for more influence in the world to defend liberal values. However, this does not rule out increased transatlantic cooperation. On the contrary, there is an urgent need for more cooperation on the urgent problems of our time, such as the fight against climate change.
For some years now, the United States has been turning away from Europe, which is reflected under the presidency Donald Trumps has accelerated dramatically and which is being exacerbated not least by a serious crisis within America. With the new President taking office Joe Biden we expressly promote the renewal and strengthening of transatlantic relations. It is time for democratic forces on both sides of the Atlantic to meet constructively and become aware of their shared responsibility..."
(Excerpt from the joint resolution of the EUD and the JEF of 19.1.21: "Europe and the USA: emphasize common interests, defend common values").Programmatic statement of the CDU on European policy:
“The unity of Europe is a success story that is firmly linked to the CDU. Germany, too, will only do well in the long run if Europe does well.
The European Union is more than a community of values ​​and economics: Above all, the unity of Europe has secured us freedom and security, peace and prosperity for more than six decades. We want to strengthen this unity and make the EU more capable of acting. The CDU was, is and will remain the party of the European idea. Germany is the anchor of stability in the European Union.”
(Quoted from the CDU's website on "European policy and the euro". The CDU's election program for the 2021 federal election is not yet available).Programmatic statements of the SPD - "Sovereign Europe in the world":
“Our goal is to fundamentally strengthen Europe so that we can continue to preserve our independence and our way of life in a multipolar world. 
Such a Europe can equally use its influence to protect and strengthen European values ​​and interests, act as a self-confident power of peace and thus help shape a cooperative, multilateral world order..."
(Excerpt from the draft of the SPD election program for the 2021 federal election. The Europe chapter is headed: “Strengthening Europe means strengthening cohesion”).Programmatic statements from Bündnis 90/Die Grünen – “We continue to build Europe”
“We see Germany as having a central responsibility for the cohesion and further development of the EU. Most recently, however, Berlin was at best managed, often slowed down. We want to actively shape European politics again - with a clear value compass with our European partners. Our goal is an EU that sticks together and moves forward...."
(Excerpt from the draft of the Bundestag election program 2021 by Bündnis 90/Die Grünen)Statement of the scientist Professor Mario Telò:
“They (the EU) should present their concrete proposals for a and embed it in a new global strategy to deepen and update the 2016 Mogherini document. The EU proposal of December 2 (A New Transatlantic Agenda for Global Change) is a step in the right direction, but it is not yet politically strong enough. With passive waiting for suggestions from Joe Bidenand his new foreign minister Antony blinken the EU would effectively return to the "junior partner" model within NATO..."
(Mario Telo: “The new US president and his limitations”; Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte, No. ½-2021; page 25 ff).Statement by journalist Thomas Spang:
"If the joint restoration project of the 'West' is to succeed, the Europeans must give up their role as spectators, actively assume more responsibility and shoulder greater burdens."
(From the comment of Thomas Spang “US foreign policy demands Europe”; Voice of Heilbronn, February 10.2.21, XNUMX). Statements by diplomat Ekkehard Brose:
"If we want to be an effective transatlantic partner, we must strengthen our European decision-making capacity..."
(Excerpt from an interview with Ekkehard Brose, former Ambassador to Iraq; Heilbronner Voice, February 26.2.21, XNUMX: “The window is open again”). These quotes reflect the German-European perspective; they are to be supplemented with the view from the outside.  

Immediately after Biden's speech at the Munich Security Conference, the New York Times published an extensive report written by three experienced journalists and supplemented by three other reporters. (David E SangerSteven ErlangerRoger Cohen: "Biden Tells Allies 'America Is Back', but Macron and Merkel Push Back" - contributed reporting: Melissa EddieElian Peltier and Mark Landler – New York Times, 19.2/20.2.21/XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX). In this report, among other things, the different reactions of Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel described on Biden's speech. The term “push back” – “rejection” – was already used in the headline; one should think of the word “cautious” because, as the article puts it, the past four years have taken a toll on US influence and power. Macron's catchphrase of the "strategic autonomy" of Europe is quoted, because "Europe can no longer rely solely on the USA, which is looking with increasing attention to Asia, especially China. Macron's concept of "strategic autonomy" was first published in November 2020. So it was conceived at a time when Donald Trump still ruled in the White House and the world had to expect new surprises every day. After her first experiences with Trump in May 2017, didn't the Chancellor also declare that Europe must take its fate into its own hands? As things stand today, the question is what Europe should and should expect Donald Trump Running again for the presidency in 2024. Stephen Cornelius describes this stalemate in the United States in drastic terms: “For Biden, foreign policy strength is … only borrowed. In two years, at the latest in four years, the voters will decide on the resurrection of the demon. Whoever has to rule with this threat is weak and vulnerable in the eyes of his adversaries" (commentary by Stephen Cornelius: "Planless in the West"; sueddeutsche.de, 19.2.21). The term "demon" refers to Donald Trump; America's adversaries are China, Russia and others, to whom Trump has given one joker after another for four years.  

In the NYT article, the reaction Angela Merkels did not describe it as “push back”, but she also added her praise for Biden calling off the troop withdrawal from Germany with the warning that “our interests will not always coincide.” This statement by the Chancellor was also used as a reference to understood Germany's ambivalent situation in relation to China, an important market for German cars and other high-tech products. Also as a reference to the disputes over Nord Stream 2.

The concept of the European Union for European security, for the revitalization of the transatlantic relationship and for the European contribution on the world stage, which has been so much called for, is still pending. When it was drafted with the Americans, it is reassuring that the White House is now governed by a man – together with a team – for whom Europe is a partner in politics and not a competitor on the world market, who can possibly be tamed with derogatory words and tariffs can make. But "Europe must play along if it doesn't just want to be a piece on the board," writes the British journalist and author Paul Mason on the geo-political situation after Great Britain left the Community (Paul Mason: Sovereign but alone” in JPG – International Politics and Society, 26.1.21/XNUMX/XNUMX).

The conclusion: Europe must become stronger, more self-confident and must be prepared to take on more responsibility in world affairs. Not least after the Biden speech in which the new American President announced that the hour of diplomacy had come. Strength, self-confidence, more responsibility - one tends to think in military terms first. Military strength is certainly part of the premier league of world politics, but tanks and rockets alone are not enough to take on more responsibility. Biden knows that he also needs allies who implement jointly defined goals with the entire toolbox of political means and, above all, with diplomatic skills. Trump apparently did not know these recipes with his "America first" policy. It is time that the EU, together with the US and other allies, developed a common concept that takes into account the realities of today and tomorrow:  

  • A self-confident China that has long since set out to
    one day to become the dominant power in world politics.
  • Putin's Russia, which is still crashing after the collapse of the USSR 
    has not wounded.
  • The developments in the Indian subcontinent, to which Europe has hardly reacted to date.
  • The many small autocrats in Europe and elsewhere who somehow “get involved”
    want, if only in the end to maintain their own position of power.
  • Africa, right on Europe's doorstep.
  • Sudamerica
  • and and and. We live in a complicated world.

Yesterday there was talk of the “clash of cultures”, today and tomorrow it is about power and zones of influence. "China seeks victory in system conflict," writes Stephen Cornelius in his comment entitled "Planlos im Westen" (sueddeutsche.de 19.2.21). “China is following a plan of advancement that, after economic leadership in the world, also envisages military dominance, at least in the region. This would not be reprehensible if the goal of this rise was not victory in the system conflict, the implementation of an authoritarian, technology-controlled control state that takes its citizens’ freedom and cements the party’s claim to power.” And because Europe has to reckon with all these challenges, it sounds like it so antiquated if about Viktor Orban cites the defense of the Christian Occident as one of the goals of his policy, or when a referendum is organized in Switzerland to forbid the approximately 30 Muslim women who wear a full face veil there in future to do so. At all times it was possible to stylize battles in secondary theaters into something very important. 

Various headlines in the Süddeutsche Zeitung show what the current and future global political disputes are about: "Beijing is bursting with self-confidence" (sueddeutsche.de, March 4.3.21, 10.3.21); "The showdown begins" (sueddeutsche.de, 11.3.21); “Plan goal: Being independent from the rest of the world” (sueddeutsche.de, XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX).  

At this point it should be noted again: The global system conflict is also about military strength, but ultimately this conflict cannot be won with tanks and missiles, which is why disarmament and arms control are an important part of security policy. China, which is increasing its military spending sharply, is showing with its New Silk Road project how to gain zones of influence – beyond the military: economic power, investment aid, cheap loans, targeted takeover of infrastructure facilities, e.g. ports, airports, key industries – and last but not least through corona masks and vaccine. This geopolitical struggle is primarily about political and economic power and not about the destruction of the world.

How skilfully and farsightedly China is using its corona vaccine to promote the rest of the export business was described in the New York Times these days: 
Brazil has been planning to set up a 5G network for a long time, but initially wanted to do so without the Chinese giant Huawei due to the warnings from the USA. Then came the pandemic - similar to Trump in the USA, the Brazilian President had operated very carelessly for a long time. When Covid-19 then threw everything upside down in Brazil, the Minister for Telecommunications traveled to Beijing to negotiate with Huawei. "I took the opportunity and asked for a vaccine," the minister is quoted as saying in the New York Times. Two weeks later, the bidding rules for the 5G network were published in Brazil: Huawei was admitted to the bidding process alongside the European companies Nokia and Ericsson – this was not previously planned. "Suddenly, Beijing finds itself with enormous new leverage in Latin America, a region where it has a vast web of investments and ambitions to expand trade, military partnerships and cultural ties." , in a region where it already has a wide network of investments to further develop trade, military partnerships and cultural ties". The report notes that China has faced a gap in relation to Covid-19, while wealthy countries - including the US - are hoarding tens of millions of vaccine doses. (New York Times, 16.3.21/XNUMX/XNUMX: "Brazil Needs Vaccines, China is Benefiting").

What should Europe do?

Back to the original question: what should Europe do? Detlef Puhl, security expert and former senior advisor to NATO, put it this way in a recent journal article about the Macron Doctrine: “In view of the fundamental changes in the international system, in which competition, even the disputes between several great powers for their own spheres of influence, are gaining in importance, for him (Macron) nothing less than a “reinvention of international cooperation” is up for debate. And for Europeans to have a role to play in this, the structure of a “political Europe” must be put in place, a “stronger Europe that can raise its voice, carry its weight with its principles.” Detlef Puhl: “French Declaration of Independence”; IPG – International Politics and Society, 30.11.20/XNUMX/XNUMX).

It is noteworthy that, in addition to the long-standing considerations of French President Macron, there are also fundamental statements from Germany. In a speech broadcast from Berlin at the inauguration of the Fritz Stern Chair at the Brookings Institution in Washington on March 9.3.2021, XNUMX, the German Foreign Minister called Heiko Maas the USA and Europe to form a common alliance against autocrats. You have to act together "if Russia, China or other countries threaten our security and prosperity, democracy, human rights and international law." Regarding the fears that have arisen in the USA about Macron's concept of "European sovereignty", Maas said: "Investing in European sovereignty means investing in the transatlantic partnership." Only a strong, open and united Europe will "continue to be an important partner for the United States in the future" (report on the Maas speech: "Maas demands Alliance against autocrats" in sueddeutsche.de, March 9.3.21, XNUMX).  

The American President has proposed a summit for democracy, Foreign Minister Maas and his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian spoke of an alliance for multilateralism. It should be possible to develop a common transatlantic concept from all of this.  

The EU still has homework to do

After looking at the major future foreign policy tasks of the EU, here are a few more aspects of the internal development of the European Union. The pandemic has also shaken up the agenda in Europe. An example of this: The conference on the future of Europe should have started in February 2020, previously Emmanuel Macron suggested and by Ursula von der Leyen had been supported. This project, which is so important for the further development of the European integration process, was also thrown off the track by Corona. The conference is now scheduled to begin on May 9.5.21, 2022 in the form of a public dialogue and will present conclusions in spring XNUMX. "We need treaty changes if this is what the citizens want." David Sassoli, the President of the EU Parliament recently quoted in a report in the Süddeutsche Zeitung. The nine-person executive committee includes: Manfred weber (CSU), the EPP parliamentary group leader. He is quoted in the SZ report as follows: "Some member states seem downright afraid of discussing the future of Europe." For Katarina Barley (SPD), the Vice President of Parliament, it is an encouraging sign that three quarters of Europeans in a survey in autumn 2020 see the future conference positively; in Germany it was 59 percent. However, Barley warned against seeing the future conference as a "mandatory exercise" with the results already in place. (Quotes from: sueddeutsche.de 10.3.21: "A 'democratic pact' for Europe").

The Europa-Union Germany has - in accordance with its very own mandate - repeatedly dealt with the further development of the European Union. n Europa aktiv No. 5/2020, the association body of the EUD wrote Secretary General Christian Moss of “new hopes” in 2021 and especially for the Future Conference: “But given the diverse existential challenges that urgently require institutional adjustments, it is obvious that it will and must come and that Europe needs a new convention. Moos writes of “institutional adjustments”; this term almost calls for treaty changes. However, in the report of the Süddeutsche Zeitung hopes are scaled back: "Such ideas are rejected in many capital cities." conference will actually only be a "compulsory exercise".

The pandemic has overlaid many issues and set the European agenda for 2020, for better or for worse. Initially, after the Council had decided on the Corona aid package worth 2020 billion euros and the multi-year financial framework in July 750, there was something like a spirit of optimism: However, this quickly subsided when Poland and Hungary threatened to let the entire package fail , if the associated rule of law mechanism were not abolished. In order to “save” the whole thing, the compromise proposed by the German Council Presidency was finally approved in Parliament, after various demands by Parliament had been met. Negotiating the compromise meant that a lot of time was lost in preparing the details of the Corona aid package, and the mood among the 27 member states had clouded over again.  

With the election victory of Joe Biden The skies over Europe also cleared up again, only to cloud over again when Poland and Hungary recently filed complaints with the ECJ against the compromise on the rule of law mechanism. It shows that even with the compromise, the question of how to ensure compliance with the principles of democracy and the rule of law in the EU is far from over. The Hungarian Minister of Justice Judit varga wrote on Facebook: "We cannot allow this EU provision, which seriously violates EU law, to remain in force" (sueddeutsche.de, March 11.3.21, 18.2.21: "Poland and Hungary are suing the ECJ against the EU rule of law clause" ). Although the compromise agreed that the new rules should be reviewed by the ECJ, convinced Europeans who know about the situation of the judiciary in Hungary and Poland can only react to such statements with mixed feelings, since Poland and Hungary are among the largest recipients of grants the EU programs. They are certainly entitled to complain to the ECJ, but the ECJ has repeatedly certified that the two countries have violated the treaties. The highest European court has repeatedly certified that Poland's judicial reform violates European law. Hungary was reprimanded by the ECJ for the way in which refugees are held in “accommodations” close to the border in a manner similar to detention. On February XNUMX, XNUMX, the Commission initiated infringement proceedings against Hungary because it did not want to accept a ruling by the ECJ on dealing with NGOs. It seems strange that these countries should make themselves the guardians of EU law. Poland and Hungary have mutually pledged to block any sanctions at the end of infringement proceedings; such sanctions would require unanimity in the Council. Perhaps both countries are expecting another lucrative compromise, but they are not doing their countries any service. The game about and with the basic values ​​of the EU cannot be dragged on for years.  

For far too long, the autocrats in the European Union have been given a free hand to undermine democracy and the rule of law. Too many compromises have been made, criticizes the Heilbronn member of the Bundestag and member of the EUD, Michael Link(FDP) in an interview with the Heilbronner Voice. Link fears that Hungary and Poland could repeat the game elsewhere (Heilbronner Voice, January 7.1.21th, XNUMX: "Too many compromises"). One consequence of these compromises was and is the weakening of citizens' trust in the EU and the weakening of the Union's external image. What is depressing is that the responsible politicians have done this weakening to themselves and are still doing it. Hopefully there will be a growing realization that the EU must also defend its values ​​within the community. The question is whether the citizens of Hungary and Poland realize what consequences the actions of their politicians have on the image of their countries in Europe?  

That even the patience of the EPP Group in the European Parliament was running out and Viktor Orban the expulsion of his party Fidesz with a declaration of resignation should be a clear sign. At some point, be it in connection with the agricultural subsidy for large farms in Hungary or in connection with the ongoing Polish judicial reform, there will (have to) be a showdown. It is not only the credibility of the EU that is at stake, but also the trust of the citizens in the European project. If, over time, the idea of ​​double standards when it comes to democracy and the rule of law becomes established in the European public, that would be the end of the alliance against autocrats around the world, even before they could even follow the offer of Joe Biden ever started.

Unfinished business in keywords

  • Climate policy as a permanent task

The Carbon Border Tax mentioned in the European Green Deal - it has been discussed in the EU for many years and provides for levying a CO2 price on all imported goods, which is based on the CO2 emissions generated during production. Only the producer in another EU country has to pay the Carbon Border Tax. In an essay on this subject, MdB Metin Hakverdi (SPD) currently describes an opportunity for Europe and the USA to agree on a CO2 compensation system and thus become pioneers in the fight against climate change. Hakverdi currently sees in the USA supporters from very different camps: "Not only left-wing climate activists approve of them, but also protectionist-leaning opponents of globalization who want to protect the American economy from dumping products from abroad". The list of Biden's climate protection measures is long, the paper notes, and will not necessarily please many of his political opponents. But Biden has with the appointment of the world-renowned and networked former Secretary of State John Kerry sent a clear signal to the special envoy for the climate. (Metin Hakverdi: “The New Transatlantic Alliance”; in IPG – International Politics and Society, 1.3.21).

  • Expansion of infrastructure, digitization and education systems.
  • Asylum, refugee and migration policies as part of the strategy for Africa and the Middle East
  • And before, above, below and next to everything: defeating the pandemic and its consequences

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